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DOES THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP 
 STILL NEED A “SUCCESS STORY”? 
 
 
 
Vasile ROTARU* 
 
 
Abstract. The article undertakes a comparative analysis of the evolution of the six former 
soviet republics within the framework of the Eastern Partnership, highlighting the differences between 
the levels of Europeanization of these countries. The research demonstrates that after two years of 
existence, the Eastern Partnership still needs to convince the high-level European leaders about its 
relevance for the EU foreign policy and to become more attractive for the post soviet republics. As the 
economic crisis and the Arab Spring shifted EU’s attention from its Eastern neighbours and the 
rollback of democracy that took place in some Eastern partners, and the lack of positive progress in 
others increased EU leaders’ reluctance towards former soviet republics, the Eastern Partnership needs 
a new impetus. A “successful story” could be a powerful example both for the Eastern neigbhours and 
the EU skeptical leaders. Republic of Moldova is the most active country within the Eastern 
Partnership surpassing Georgia and Ukraine as the best pupil. However before becoming a successful 
story, Chisinau has to implement more essential reforms and to curb the widespread corruption. Which 
is not an easy tusk without the EU’s support.  
 The methods used for this research are documentary and discourse analysis. 
 
Keywords: Europeanization, Warsaw summit, EU’s Eastern neighbours, membership 
perspectives 
 
 
 
 After being postponed and relocated, the second summit of the Eastern 
Partnership took place in Warsaw (Poland), on September 29-30. With only few 
European leaders (Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, being the only high-
level EU leader attending the event, even Sweden, one of the co-initiators of 
the Eastern Partnership, failed to send Foreign Minister Carl Bildt), and with a 
symbolic empty chair instead of the representative of Belarus, the summit felt 
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the full effects of the economic crisis and the Arab Spring (during the summit 
France’s president Nicolas Sarkozy chose to attend the opening of a railway in 
Morocco). The joint declaration assessed that “much has been achieved 
already” in the Eastern neighbourhood: political and economic reforms were 
implemented, the relations between the EU and its Eastern European partners 
have deepened significantly, the negotiations on Association Agreements and 
dialogue on visa-free regime progressed. Though, while the European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso was describing the Eastern 
Partnership summit as very successful, the majority of the European media 
were in general restrained when enumerating the achievements of the meeting 
(Siarkiewicz Paweł, 2011), and the declaration of the UK deputy prime minister, 
Nick Clegg, that the EU should offer the possibility of closer integration, and 
even full membership to any Eastern Partnership country that meets the 
criteria, made much noise. Why are not EU countries ready to offer more to the 
Eastern partners? 
 On one side, many EU countries have very extensive and intensive 
bilateral relationships with Russia, which are often oficially designated as 
‘strategic’ or ‘special’ partnerships and framed by bilateral treaties and 
agreements. Within this context, these countries would not want to upset 
Moscow, which perceives the six former soviet republics as its sphere of 
influence. Chief among these EU members with special relation with Russia are 
four of the large European states, Germany, Italy, France and Spain (David, 
Gower and Haukkala, 2011). As Andreas Umland, Associate Professor of 
German and European Studies at the Department of Political Sciences of the 
National University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy", pointed in the interview for 
“EUinside”, “Germany, France or Italy have spent too much time on courting 
Russia, and has given insufficient attention to developments in the Eastern 
Partnership countries” (Adelina Marini, 2011). 
 On the other side, the six former soviet republics have not made much 
progress on Europeanization neither. The Eastern Partnership is based on a 
community of values and principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, the rollback of 
democracy that has taken place in some Eastern Partnership countries over the 
last year, and the lack of positive progress in others though (Shumylo-Tapiola 
Olga, 2011), gave some European leaders more justification for their reluctance 
towards European Eastern neighbours. Furthermore, the refusal of the EU’s 
Eastern partners to sign the declaration on Belarus at the end of the second 
Eastern Partnership summit, was described by some analysts as a simple 
expression of "deep concern over deteriorating human rights, democracy and 
rule of law" and another prove of “wasting” money in the region (Pawlak, and 
Kurowska, 2011), even though, the motivation was different (diplomats say 
Georgia feared revenge in the form of Belarus' recognition of its breakaway 
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provinces and Ukraine feared trade problems with its neighbour (Rettman 
Andrew, 2011a). 
 Anyhow it would be, the Eastern Partnership has to restore the 
confidence among the EU leaders towards the eastern neighbours. Which is not 
an easy task. Take, for instance Ukraine, the largest European country after 
Russia. With its 46 million consumers the country represents the biggest market 
in Eastern Europe. Once regional leader in the Europeanization process, now, 
however, Kiev is giving Brussels big headaches. The country has squandered 
the chance of transformation promised by the 2004 Orange Revolution and is 
wracked by permanent political strife (De Vaal Thomas, 2011). Ukraine was the 
first of the six former soviet republics which started the negotiations for the 
Association Agreement with the EU, due to be completed by the end of this 
year. However, all the efforts are now in jeopardy because of former prime 
minister Yulia Tymoshenko conviction, labeled as politically motivated.  
 And the Tymoshenko trial is not the first launched against Yanukovych 
rivals since he came to power: former interior minister Yuriy Lutsenko, former 
defense minister Valeriy Ivashchenko, senior custom officials Anatoly 
Makarenko and Taras Shepitko, treasury officials Tetyana Slyuz and Tetyana 
Grytsun face similar charges. 
 Since the election of president Yanukovych, Ukraine has experienced a 
significant deterioration in its democratic framework (Tutu Desmond, Von 
Weizsäcker Richard and Havel Vaclav, 2011). The President has been 
increasingly consolidating his power and total control over the executive, the 
legislative and the judiciary. The constitution adopted in 2004 that shifted many 
powers from the president to the parliament was cancelled, and the previous 
1996 version built around strong presidential authority was reinstalled. The 
Global Corruption Barometer 2010, published by Transparency International, 
shows that Ukraine scores among the worst in the former Soviet Union, and it's 
judiciary system is the most corrupt in the world (Lavrov Vlad, 2010).  
 On the international arena, even though Yanukovych states that EU 
integration is Ukraine’s  priority, in the beginning of his mandate, Kiev 
concluded an array of agreements to meet Russia’s expectations, commencing 
with the deal “fleet for gas”. It is true that the current dispute over gas prices 
alienated Kiev from Moscow, however, there cannot be any guarantee that 
Yanukovich will not come to terms with Russia in energy relations, which 
possibly will include economic concessions in return for Russian political 
support. And the Belarusian experience suggests that such an exchange leads to 
loss of sovereignty and succumbing to Russian influence (Pavlenko Rostyslav, 
2011).  
 There will be no wonder if Kiev is attracted by a possible Russian’s 
Eurasian Union or the Custom Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, in 
case the Association Agreement with the EU is not signed by the end of 2011. 
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 As long as Yanukovich was one of the few world leaders that supported 
Aleksandr Lukashenko before the 2010  presidential elections, congratulating 
him after the results were announced (Чирва Виктория, 2011), and did not 
eliminate the possibility that one day Ukraine could join the Custom Union 
during a meeting with Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, in November 2010, 
it is clear that Ukraine will not hesitate to take further advantage of its 
geostrategic position and play the neo-Titoist game of  balancing in order to 
win resources, to strengthen local elites and provide an excuse for the lack of 
reform (Kobzova, Jana;  Popescu, Nicu; Wilson, Andrew, 2011).   
 To avoid the alienation of Ukraine from the EU, the West should be 
seeking to bring more European standards to Ukraine, rather than withdrawing 
from the trade accord and leaving Kiev with little option but to head in 
Moscow’s direction, (Riley Alan, 2011). The EU should not punish Ukraine 
because of its leaders, because such a decision will also have consequences for 
the EU and its entire Eastern Partnership. Isolating Ukraine serves no purpose 
other than to increase instability and uncertainty in this region (Paul Amanda, 
2011). Therefore, the EU should not hesitate in signing the Association 
Agreement with Kiev and even offer membership perspectives in order to keep 
the country on the way of democratic reforms. Democracy is a long process 
and the West should have more patience with the Eastern neighbours. 
Furthermore, as Lithuanian foreign minister Audronius Azubalis stated, the EU 
should move forward on bringing Ukraine into the Western hemisphere 
because the decision about the Association Agreement could change European 
geopolitics for decades to come (Rettman Andrew, 2011a).  
 The “black sheep” of the Eastern Partnership, Belarus, officially did 
not even participate at the Warsaw summit. Since the December 2010 post-
election crackdown Lukashenko is banned from traveling to the EU and was 
not invited to the forum, while the foreign minister refused to attend the 
summit. Only Belarusian opposition members were present at the event.  
 Since December 2010, the Belarus leader preferred an alliance with 
Russia to the European plan for transforming his country (Minsk ratified the 
agreement to join the free trade zone with Russia and Kazakhstan), however, 
the economic situation and Russia’s attempts to subordinate part of Belarus’ 
sovereignty (Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin stated that he would 
support the unification of Russia and Belarus and Moscow has pressured 
Alexander Lukashenko to sell his country's key industrial assets to Russians in 
exchange for a bailout) seem to have forced Lukashenko to reassess the 
relations with the West. 
 On the other side, the Belarus’ leader bases his power on the “deal” 
with ordinary people: modest prosperity and stability instead of democratic 
rights. As its country is close to bankruptcy, the soaring of staple food prices 
staining the budgets of millions of Belarusians and fueling public discontent 
Does the Eastern Partnership Still Nees a ‘Success Story’? 
 
107 
 
with their longtime leader (Mijuk Goran), Lukashenko feels unsafe in his 
presidential palace. According to a poll conducted by the independent 
Lithuania-based Institute of Socioeconomic and Political Studies, just over 30% 
of voters currently support Alexander Lukashenko, and it is not just the young 
whose faith in the president is dwindling (Mijuk, Goran, 2011).  
 Therefore, Belarus’ leader seems to be again willing to approach the 
EU. In August, this year, he started “pardoning” political prisoners and the next 
month, during talks with Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Lukashenko promised to 
release all protesters who were arrested during last year’s presidential election. 
In the opinion of Alyaksandr Milinkievich, a Belarusian opposition leader, even 
Minsk’s boycott of the Warsaw Summit of the Eastern Partnership should not 
be considered as a break with Brussels, as in reality (and unofficially), Aleksandr 
Lukashenko’s attitude towards European demands has become ever more 
lenient. Milinkievich considers that the harsh speeches against EU diplomats 
have served only to divert attention from the regime’s release of political 
prisoners – and thus, from the moment of weakness of Lukashenko's 
authoritarian rule” (Milinkievich, Alyaksandr, 2011). 
 The $9 billion (in the form of loans) promised Belarus by the EU 
during Warsaw summit could be the first sign of resumption of relations 
between Brussels and Minsk even Lukashenko has not shown any interest yet, 
as the money comes only in exchange for free parliamentary elections and 
release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners.  
 Belarus leader might try to resume the game of balancing the country 
between the EU and Russia, however Brussels should not hesitate to support 
Belarus conditionally in order to help Minsk not to “sell” the country to the 
“bigger brother”. On the other side, anything that can be done to lift visa 
restrictions and facilitate travel for students and professionals, in order to grasp 
the democratic values and on returning home to put pressure on the 
government in Minsk, could bear fruit in the future. The EU should increase 
the support of the civil society as “in eastern Europe, far more than in the Arab 
world, the EU is a guiding star for millions of people, who feel European but 
are frustrated by inadequate governments and persistent poverty” (De Waal 
Thomas, 2011). 
 As Belarus, Azerbaijan is headed by an autocratic regime too. President 
Aliyev's family has ruled the country with an iron grip since 1993. The current 
president came to power after fraudulent elections and has no restraint in 
persecuting the opposition. And after that the country is ruled by a dynastic 
regime, the 2009 constitutional referendum abolished term limits for the 
president and restricted the freedom of the press.  
 The hydrocarbon resources represent both the wealth and the “curse” 
of the country. In the absence of mature democratic institutions the revenues 
from oil exports are used for enrichment of a minority clique and for the 
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consolidation of president’s power. Azerbaijan has made only limited progress 
on instituting market-based economic reforms. Pervasive public and private 
sector corruption and structural economic inefficiencies remain a drag on long-
term growth, particularly in non-energy sectors (C.I.A.,  2011).  
 Within the Eastern Partnership, the country seems to be only interested 
in regional security issues, the economic aspects and visa liberalization regime. 
Furthermore, the Azerbaijani officials have claimed that their country would 
never take part in the multinational dimension of the Eastern Partnership with 
Armenia, as long as the neighbouring country holds control over some 
Azerbaijani territories. However, the EU leaders do not seem willing to put 
pressure on Baku regime, just because the country is a wealth of energetic 
resources and represents an alternative to Russian gas. Which, obviously, justify 
the critics on the double standards of the EU policy towards its neighbours: 
“Aliyev came to Warsaw because his country has oil and gas that Europe 
needs” (Siarkiewicz, Paweł, 2011). 
 Yet, the EU should not be tempted to accept concessions in the 
relationship with Baku within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. In 
fact, Azerbaijan is interested as much in selling the oil and gas to EU, a stable 
and lucrative market, as the EU is interested in buying them. Therefore Brussels 
should not hesitate to make pressure on authorities to implement democratic 
reforms, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to strengthen 
the rule of law. And last, the rule of law, democracy and transparency is in the 
interests not only the EU, but of “oil companies, that would like to invest in the 
country and to see their investments to be protected by states” (Alieva Leila 
2011).  Furthermore, Azerbaijan might be self sufficient in financial terms, but 
is still in need of the European “know how” and technologies. 
 The EU should also increase its involvement in the settle of               
Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict, as because of this disputed territory, the 
hatred between Azerbaijan and Armenia has reached unacceptable limits, 
making the cooperation of the two neighbouring countries impossible even 
within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has 
increased the military budget and a report of the International Crisis Group 
warns about a risk of increasing ceasefire violations and the possibility that 
Azerbaijan may be tempted to seek a military solution for the settlement of this 
situation (International Crisis Group, 2007). 
 With tense relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, there is no wonder why 
Armenia’s foreign and security policies are Russian-oriented (Russia was 
Armenia’s strongest ally during the Nagorno-Karabakh war). Armenia is a 
member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and last year, 
Yerevan extended the term of the deployment of the Russian military base until 
2044. Yet, while the authorities claim that this was done for ensuring the 
security of the country, many experts argue that the presence of the base is an 
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obstacle to Western investment and reforms of the Armenian public and 
political system that is too closely linked with the Russian leadership 
(Hayrumyan Naira, 2011).  
 Armenia sees the Eastern Partnership as an economic opportunity in 
terms of trade, investment and aid, as well as an opportunity to improve 
Armenia’s position in the region. The government cautiously avoids talking of 
EU membership so as to safeguard its relationship with its strategic Russian 
partner. (Babayan and Shapovalova 2011: 2). With a president who came to 
power after contested elections, according to Freedom House, Armenia has not 
improved its democratic performance since the political crisis of 2008. The 
judicial system is still vulnerable, corruption is deeply ingrained in Armenian 
society and a small group of elites continues to dominate the political and 
economic spheres. (Iskandaryan Alexander, 2011: 68).  
 Thus, in the Caucasus, Georgia remains the only Eastern Partnership 
country with a real history of successful reform (Bezpiatchuk Zhanna, 2011). 
The radically improved tax collection, the reform of the police, the drastic 
reduction of corruption and the significant inflows of foreign investments made 
Georgia the most modernized post-soviet state, except for the Baltic republics. 
Therefore, Georgia has criticized the EU for not respecting the principle of 
'more for more' and hopes for an explicit promise of future accession. 
 However, while Georgia implemented successfully economic reforms 
there is much work to do on the democratic front. Politics is monopolized, the 
opposition is virtually absent from the parliament, being often vilified and 
sometimes harassed. The media is less free than a few years ago, and there is 
the rumor that Saakashvili will continue as a prime minister after his term 
expires in 2013, under a modified constitution that would give the Prime 
Minister more power (Popescu Nicu, 2011). 
 Yet the EU could have more leverage to put pressure on Tbilisi 
government if the Eastern Partnership offered Georgia what the country 
desires the most: security guarantees and avenues for the restoration of its 
territorial integrity. And this should not be just a matter of reflection. One way 
or another, the targets of the Partnership and long-term interests in the 
Caucasus will not be carried out without making headway towards dealing with 
conflicts (Söderström Jenny, 2010). 
 Considering the political and economic situation of the above mentioned 
countries and the reserved attitude of many high-level European leaders, the 
conclusion that emerges is that the Eastern Partnership still needs a successful 
story to convince the skeptics and to boost the democratization of the 
neighboured authoritarian regimes. The West has long believed that if just one 
ex-Soviet state – outside the Baltic republics, can become a functioning market 
democracy, it will be a powerful example for the rest (Buckley Neil, 2011). And 
within this context, the sought impetus might become the Republic of 
Vasile ROTARU 
 
110 
 
Moldova, the only one out of six countries in the partnership that has in reality 
made progress towards further integration with the EU (Shumylo-Tapiola Olga, 
2011).  
 After becoming part of the Eastern Partnership, the tiny former soviet 
republic commenced the implementation of the reforms before being asked to 
do so by the EU (Ivan and Ghinea, 2010: 11). “Moldova does not have another 
decade to modernize. It only has a few years to make a radical and irreversible 
break with the past. That is why we are in a hurry to move as fast as possible in 
relations with the EU” Moldova’s Prime Minister Vlad Filat has wrote recently 
in an article for the EUobserver (Filat Vlad 2011). Moldova seems to be the 
most active country in its desire to take advantage of the opportunities being 
offered (Bezpiatchuk Zhanna 2011). And even it is still the poorest and not 
very well known country in Europe, Moldova’s EU vocation seems to be firm. 
Russia’s attempts to change the political course after the 2010 elections (one 
week after the anticipate parliamentary elections, on November 28, 2010, 
Sergey Naryshkin, head of the Administration of the President of Russia 
trevelled to Chisinau to support a left wing governmental coalition, loyal to 
Moscow, for the price of cheaper gas and wine imports from Moldova), failed 
and the country recreated the Alliance for the European Integration, thus 
staying on Brussels’ radar. 
 In 2010 Moldova was one of the top three fastest growing economies in 
Europe (Filat Vlad, 2011) and the last EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy 
report shows that of the six Eastern Partnership countries Moldova received 
the best marks surpassing Georgia and Ukraine as the best student in the class 
(Boonstra Jos, 2011: 2). Moldova has also made substantial progress towards 
launching talks on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and 
Prime Minister, Vlad Filat, stated that his country is not attracted by Vladimir 
Putin’s Eurasian Union and sees its place in the European Union. 
 However, Moldova still faces big challenges. Before being a successful 
story, Chisinau has to reform the police, the public administration, the judicial 
sector and to curb widespread corruption. Political uncertainty and a lack of 
resources could cause reforms to stagnate though. Moldova needs the EU 
support to continue the democratization process and to settle the frozen 
conflict in Transnistria. It is also in the EU’s interest that the country is stable 
and have efficient border control to prevent illegal migration and cross border 
crime. With Brussels’ support, both sides win: The Moldovan government will 
go to the population with good news on EU benefits and general economic 
development, and the EU will have the needed success story. 
 Even in the absense of a “success story”, the EU still can Europeanize its 
Eastern neighbours. According to critics, the Eastern Partnership lacks the 
force to deeply transform the societies in participating countries, because it 
remains ambiguous on the kind of relationship they would have with the Union 
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in the longer term (EurActiv 2011). The Europeans leaders are still skeptical 
about offering membership perspectives to the Eastern neighbours, even the 
previous experience shows that the prospect of EU entry determines much 
more involvement for domestic reform, raises economic standards and 
increases a sense of responsibility on the international stage, “from the 
Mediterranean and Nordic region to Central Europe, enlargement has proved 
to be a most successful EU foreign policy tool” (The Financial Times, 2011). 
Therefore, Brussels should not be reluctant in taking in offering accession 
perspective to the Eastern Partnership countries. On one side, membership 
perspective does not automatically guarantee membership itself and on the 
other side, Turkey was not more democratic than the Eastern partners when 
signed such an association agreement with the EU in 1963. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the EU membership perspective in the Association Agreements 
with Moldova, Ukraine or Georgia would support the European principle 
‘more for more’ and would signify a great success for the Eastern partners, 
which will gain a new status in continental geopolitics.  
 Without a more active involvement in the Eastern neighbourhood, the 
EU risks “losing” former Soviet republics (Buckley, Neil, 2011). The 
dissatisfaction with the possible postponement of the Association Agreements 
or Visa Free Travel Agreements could determine some Eastern partners to give 
in to Russia pressure or to continue their neo-Titoist balancing game, 
undermining the EU strategy of conditional engagement (Kobzova, Jana;  
Popescu, Nicu; Wilson, Andrew, 2011). With little attention paid to Eastern 
Europe or the Caucasus, the Eastern Partnership countries are in danger of 
becoming the new Europe’s South, dominated by states that are economically 
tied to Europe, but led by entrenched autocrats who can brush off Western 
criticism on democracy and human rights (Wilson Andrew, 2011).  
 The European Union should not allow the Eastern partners to loose their 
interest in the Europeanization process and the Eastern partners must 
understand that the EU takes the Eastern Partnership’s goals seriously and that 
reaching them requires complete homework (Paet Urmas, 2011). That is why it 
is essential for the EU to offer partner countries programmes with immediate 
and tangible results in different areas. Visa facilitation and trade privileges could 
be good motivations for the formers soviet republics, and these could be the 
best EU tangible advantages given by political leaders to the citizens still 
longing for Soviet times.  
On the other side, the EU should not have any restraint to support the former 
soviet republics and treat them as independent entities not as pawns organically 
connected to Russia (Sikorski Radoslaw, 2009). The European leaders should 
clearly separate political and economic issues in the relation with Russia. They 
should not let themselves blackmailed by Moscow’s geopolitical interests in the 
former soviet republics during negotiations of gas agreements or any other 
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economic treaties. UK, for instance, has managed to enjoy robust economic 
relations with Russia, despite frequent political problems. Which indicates that 
it is not necessary to be subservient to Moscow politically in order to do 
successful business in the country (David, Gower and Haukkala, 2011).  
 And not eventually, the Eastern Partnership members have to understand 
that with the “competition” from the South for EU attention and money it is in 
their best interest to follow a course of reform and democracy (Munk Jensen 
Peter 2011). The economic crisis has shown that not the EU nor Russia are 
going to accept their game of balancing for long time. The former soviet 
republics have to choose between the West and the East. And before choosing 
the Custom Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan or the possible 
Eurasian Union, the Eastern Partnership countries should reassess the current 
situation in Belarus and remember that remaining in Russian sphere of 
influence cannot guarantee their sovereignty.  
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